"I should clarify as to my intentions in this and the posts on beauty to come. I am still NOT CONVINCED that beautiful is a subjective quality as post-modern thinkers would assert, nor do I wish to be, but I am also not convinced of the truth of the Platonic response that is so often thrown around as doctrine in Torrey. Therefore, still thinking of beauty as an OBJECTIVE quality, I am exploring the Divine Conceptualism view as a more defensable position than Platonism."
I hope this clears up what I am trying to get at.
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5 comments:
hmmm. thanks for working so hard to clarify, garrett. these are big concepts, and - since i'm pretty unaquainted with this discussion and am pretty unable to understand even what i am aquainted with, i'll have to beg some patience: i fully understand that you are not denying the objectivity of beauty, but you do seem to be dissatisfied with the usual defenses of the platonic concept of it as a form.
this is valid, though i still feel somewhat fuzzy on what exactly you object to about the platonic defense of beauty as a form. these posts may just be set up for further explication of your dissatisfaction, in which case, i await them with interested; if not, however, could you clarify your rejection of the accepted answers further?
again, i'm interested, and apologize that my incapacity gets in the way of my understanding.
Not a problem, Amy. Basically, the only thing I have really said on the matter is that the Platonic view is obscure and unhelpful because of the lack of objective criterion for recognizing how a beautiful object would take part in the Form of Beauty. I will pontificate on this in my next post, which should be up no later than Tuesday.
I should say that your last greatly clarifies the issue. . . and that publically I usually argue for "ideas in the mind of God" for exactly the reasons you give.
This is great fun. . . and I hope you are having as good a time as I. Your thinking is good (it seems to me). . . and I look forward to engaging with you!
John Mark
Couple things regarding your argumentation:
First, you haven't argued against Plato, you've asserted that you don't believe him.
Second, if you wish to argue with Plato, you're first going to have to convince me that you understand him. In good medieval fashion, I'd like to see you expound Plato's view of beauty and once we all agree that's what he meant, then feel free to argue with him; otherwise, I'm afraid you're constructing a Platonic effegy for your own burning pleasure.
OR, simply stop arguing against Plato altogether and just argue FOR a Divine Conception view of objective beauty. That might be easier. :)
Also, regarding your post: When you say you're trying to define "What makes a beautiful object beautiful?" are you looking for characteristics like "harmony"? Or are you looking for the source of beauty in an object? Or, are you wondering, epistemelogically, how we can recognize beauty in multiple sources?
Caitlin
Caitlin: All in due time, my friend. :)
While I'm quite positive I don't understand the profundity of the entirety of Plato's thoughts on Beauty, I think I can safely say that Plato (on a most BASIC level) thought Beauty to be a Form, a entity with a distinct ontological status, the apex and summation of all Beauty, with all objects that are beautiful somehow reflecting the character of that Form. In a similar fashion, with objects that he thought of as good, he would say they reflected the Form of the Good.
Therefore, while I haven't plumbed the depths of Plato's thoughts on the matter, I CAN argue (and HAVE briefly argued) with his BASIC assumptions, which I DO happen to know (see above paragraph). It seems that, even if Plato rose to levels of thought that I could never even dream to ascribe to, those lofty thoughts about the Forms would be for naught if Plato's most BASIC assumptions about the nature of abstract objects (such as beauty) as Forms can be shown to be inconsistant with reality. While my argumentation on this matter HAS been brief thus far, I can assure you: more is coming. :)
As to what I mean when I ask, "What makes a beautiful object beautiful?" I mean that I am looking for an objective criterion by which I can distinguish between beautiful and ugly objects, or objects with varying degrees of beauty; a characteristic inherently within the ontological status of a thing which makes that thing beautiful. In answer to your question: all of the above. :)
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