I have been becoming less and less satisfied with the arguments I have heard for the conclusion that Beauty is an absolute, that "beautiful" is an objective quality that a thing can ontologically have. The conclusion that beauty is a subjective quality that we give to objects—a value judgment that we, as humans, place on things—is becoming more and more one that seems correct, and yet every fiber of my being doesn’t like this conclusion I feel myself being drawn to.
You might ask: Why does this even matter?
I feel very attached to the idea that Beauty is objective, mostly because of my dislike of post-modern thought, which my belief in the absolute truth of the Gospel of Jesus Christ greatly conflicts with. Clearly, if beauty is something we humans prescribe to objects; a quality not distinctly present in the ontological status of a thing, but a quality exterior to the thing and placed on it by the viewer; then beauty ceases to be objective and truthful, and is merely subject to the value judgments of individual people. If this is true, then it seems that there is no sense of absolute truth, since it is all in the eye of the beholder, and modern thought, including Christianity, which suggests that there are things that are objectively good, true and beautiful, will die out, much like Nietzsche and others suggest that it should.
That’s not good. Our entire worldview, not to mention the view we have of our salvation, is at stake.
Many in the Torrey Honors Institute, including our own dear John Mark Reynolds, deeply influenced by Platonism, will say that Beauty is a Form; that Beauty, being created by God, has a ontological status specific and separate to itself, and that all objects that we call “beautiful” somehow take a part in the Form that is Beauty. I think I disagree with this, mostly because I tend to take a more Divine Conceptualist view: that Beauty derives its nature from the nature of the mind and character of the Triune God, who is the most beautiful being that could ever be, and that all things that are considered beautiful are so because they somehow reflect the beauty of his character.
A huge problem with the objective view of beauty as held by both Platonists and Divine Conceptualists—and the problem with this view that I have been struggling with—is a definitional one: what makes a beautiful object beautiful? What criterion do we have for knowing what is objectively beautiful? (Though it’s an older post, John Mastron does a pretty good job at looking at this definitional problem on his blog. (http://jmastron.blogspot.com/))
It seems to me a copout to say, as our Platonist friends do, that things that we call beautiful are so because they take part in the Form of Beauty, because this answer really doesn’t address the problem, it only begs the question, that is, it asserts the term it is defining as its answer. Now, instead of having a useful criterion for recognizing beauty when I see it, I now have to ask, “What is it about the Form of Beauty that I can recognize in beautiful objects?”
A similar problem is found in the Divine Conceptualist view, though I believe on a lesser scale. While originally I can’t seem to pinpoint what characteristic makes a beautiful object beautiful, I can say that this object is beautiful because it somehow reflects the beauty that naturally stems from the mind and character of God. This conclusion, I believe, does not leave one in the obscurity of the Platonist response, and instead gives one something concrete to build a definition of beauty off of. Now, once I say that the beautiful is seen in the character of God, I can look to the Scriptures to find what characteristics this beautiful God has and compare beautiful objects to them, hopefully to find what makes these objects similar to our beautiful God. This response also avoids begging the question, as it seems our Platonist friends must end up doing.
Pontifications on this, as well as further problems with the Platonist response are forthcoming.
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10 comments:
Be careful not to commit the Socratic fallacy. One can know a thing without being able to define it.
Second, if beauty is subjective and God has opinions about it (which it seems at the very least He has), then wouldn't it be wise to agree with those opinions. If God (for example), thinks Heaven beautiful, what if you don't agree? Wouldn't that trouble you?
Fun discussion.
John Mark
I should add that a good start to this series would be a serious look at the "Abolition of Man."
The Mastron post seems to argue that the Socratic fallacy isn't. . . which is going to be a tough road for him to hoe.
It also depends on a reductionist confusion of "door" with what makes it up.
good thoughts, garrett, and i commend you for delving into areas you intuitively dislike but must reasonably confront.
clarifying inquiry: if Beauty is an idea in the mind of God, but is to be useful apologetically at all (it may not be, but we certainly act as if it is), then it seems as if it must be revealed generally through our internal interactions with it, as well as specifically through the revelations of His Scripture and of His Christ. we must all to some degree, imperfectly, agree about what is beautiful.
if this is true, though it may not be a satisfying conclusion, it seems like the opinion of the majority is - in this case - not to be entirely disregarded. obviously we're not going to determine objectivity by vote, but the fact that nobody in any culture reacts in disgust to roses, or sheilds their eyes in horror from a sunset on the sea means that we may have a sense of which things are beautiful in an objective way. do you think this general intuition is valid epistemically at all?
thanks for making me think.
Amy: I should clarify as to my intentions in this and the posts on beauty to come. I am still NOT CONVINCED that beautiful is a subjective quality as post-modern thinkers would assert, nor do I wish to be, but I am also not convinced of the truth of the Platonic response that is so often thrown around as doctrine in Torrey. Therefore, still thinking of beauty as an OBJECTIVE quality, I am exploring the Divine Conceptualism view as a more defensable position than Platonism.
With this in mind, I would agree with you that the fact that no reasonable person is appalled by the sight of a rose and that most people are in basic agreement about what is beautiful seems to give epistemic credence to the objectivity of beauty as a thing in existance in the mind and character of God.
Dr. Reynolds: First, I'm genuinely humbled that you chose to respond to my post; the struggles of a mere sophomore, all of which you've probably heard before in some form another. I've actually wanted to talk with you on this subject for some time--specifically on the beauty found in music--but I've been made aware that you're booked solid until sometime next semester, and so I've been unable.
It's funny that you should mention "The Abolition of Man", since it's actually the first book on my reading list for this interterm, so on that point, I think I'll take your advice and give that some serious thought.
As with Amy, I think you may be confused as to my intentions in this series, and this is most likely my own fault, as I was unclear in my exposition. Again, I do not believe that beauty is a subjective quality, but I am not convinced of a Platonic view's ability to explain its objectivity. Therefore, you won't need to convince me that it is silly to have opinions contrary to God's; I don't think that will apply to this situation. OF COURSE it would trouble me if I subjectively thought something ugly that God subjectively thought beautiful, but this really isn't the case, because not only am I not disagreeing with God's obviously correct opinion, I'm not even arguing for the subjectivity of anything.
As far as your response to the definition problem, I can't help but feel I've heard most of it before in one of your many lectures, and it still isn't very convincing. While in the abstract, I completely agree with you in that we can "know a thing without being able to define it," this notion gets very, very muddled in the particulars, when lines between the beautiful and the ugly can be much closer and less clear-cut than they are between than a sunset and a ogre. I'll go into more detail on that difficulty in a future post in this series.
Overall, thanks for reading and giving feedback, and I hope you'll continue to do so.
You say:
While in the abstract, I completely agree with you in that we can "know a thing without being able to define it," this notion gets very, very muddled in the particulars, when lines between the beautiful and the ugly can be much closer and less clear-cut than they are between than a sunset and a ogre. I'll go into more detail on that difficulty in a future post in this series.
I say:
Well, yes. But that is true in any area of knowledge. . . in any field even a newbie can get the big picture right. . . the devil is always in the details. That is not a sign of subjectivity, but difficulty.
You say:
"That is not a sign of subjectivity, but difficulty."
I SAID (to Ms. Cannon):
"...I am also not convinced of the truth of the Platonic response that is so often thrown around as doctrine in Torrey. Therefore, still thinking of beauty as an OBJECTIVE quality, I am exploring the Divine Conceptualism view as a more defensable position than Platonism."
Obviously, this problem is a sign of difficulty. Hence, I am exploring and wrestling with the difficulty of the problem. I'm not some Wheatstone kid who hasn't carefully thought any of this through and wrestled with this AS IF IT MATTERED that you can give the same speech on the objectivity of beauty to every summer. I'd like to think that what I'm saying has at least some significance that required more than a copy-and-paste answer.
On that note, you're really not responding to anything I am actually saying... and I can't help but wonder if you're merely toying with me, Dr. Reynolds. I have the utmost respect for you as a man and as an academic, but I would hope that, since you are commenting and giving me your imput on the matter, that you are actually READING what I am actually WRITING.
But carefully, Mr. Olsen. Big ideas.
You say:
Obviously, this problem is a sign of difficulty. Hence, I am exploring and wrestling with the difficulty of the problem. I'm not some Wheatstone kid who hasn't carefully thought any of this through and wrestled with this AS IF IT MATTERED that you can give the same speech on the objectivity of beauty to every summer. I'd like to think that what I'm saying has at least some significance that required more than a copy-and-paste answer.
I say:
Well, o.k. I did read what you said, but I haven't yet seen an argument against the objectivity of beauty. . .
You say:
On that note, you're really not responding to anything I am actually saying... and I can't help but wonder if you're merely toying with me, Dr. Reynolds. I have the utmost respect for you as a man and as an academic, but I would hope that, since you are commenting and giving me your imput on the matter, that you are actually READING what I am actually WRITING.
I say:
Yes. I am.
You say:
While in the abstract, I completely agree with you in that we can "know a thing without being able to define it," this notion gets very, very muddled in the particulars, when lines between the beautiful and the ugly can be much closer and less clear-cut than they are between than a sunset and a ogre.
I say:
This is the only argument in your posting regarding demands for a definition and the Socratic fallacy.
Now if your point is that such a definition is a good thing to go for. . . and that we should work on this and it will be much harder than easy examples (roses) would indicate then I agree.
My point is that the evidence you mention (difficulty in some finer examples) is not actually an argument against objective beauty (as you point out yourself) or against my claim that opponents who urge a prior need for a defintion are guilty of the Socratic fallacy. If the thing is merely hard to do, then it urges further study. . .so what we would need is an argument that further study is not helpful.
IF your claim is that the need for a definition is important to you and you are working hard to find one. . .but that it has nothing (more or less) to do with the actual existence of objective beauty then great. That was not clear to me.
Keep working on this problem. . . and do read "Abolition of Man."
You say:
"My point is that the evidence you mention (difficulty in some finer examples) is not actually an argument against objective beauty (as you point out yourself) or against my claim that opponents who urge a prior need for a defintion are guilty of the Socratic fallacy."
I say:
Agreed. But again, I am not attempting to disagree with you on either of those points. I would merely hold that, in light of both of those points, a Platonic view of Beauty is much more difficult to hold than another view of objective beauty, such as Divine Conceptualism.
You say:
"I did read what you said, but I haven't yet seen an argument against the objectivity of beauty. . . "
I say:
That is because I am not attempting to give one, since I do not hold a subjectivist position.
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